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NOTES
STATE AUTHORITY TO TAX PRIVATE INTERESTS IN
FEDERAL PROPERTY
The state taxing power is one of the fundamental powers of state
government. Not originally regarded as a possible threat to federal
sovereignty, it was recognized in the Federal Constitution as being limited
in only two respects. t In McCulloch v. Maryland, however, it was early
recognized that the power of the state to tax federal property could provide
the means of destroying federal sovereignty.2 It was determined, therefore, that the state was without power to retard, impede, burden, or in any
manner control the operations of laws constitutionally enacted by congress
and thereby limited the scope of the state taxing power. This case was the
forerunner of a series of cases of major importance dealing with state
taxation of federal property and activities. No problem of state federal
relations has given rise to greater variation and uncertainty. The uncertainty of which is best described by Justice Jackson in United States v.
Allegheny, wherein he stated, "looking backwards it is easy to see that
1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 & 3.
2. 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).

[2291
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the line between the taxable and immune has been drawn by an unsteady
hand."
Many cases have since added to this wavering line, the most
recent of which are commented on in this note in an effort to spell out
the state authority to tax private rights in federal property.
Because the question of intergovernmental tax immunity most often
arises as a result of state taxation of private interests within federally
owned areas, the basis of state legislative jurisdiction therein need always be
established.
It is well recognized that persons residing on lands owned by the
4
United States may not for that reason alone be exempt from state taxation.
The basis of the states' jurisdiction to tax within the federal enclave was
regarded as depending to a large degree upon the means by which the
federal area was created. 5
It is generally recognized that federal title to lands within territorial
boundaries of the states were acquired by one of three methods; namely,
(1) by the purchase from the states with their consent within the letter of
Article 1, Section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution; (2) by
purchase without the states consent as by condemnation and eminent
domain, or (3) by continued possession with reservation of jurisdiction
over lands at the time of admission of the state to the union.6
If land is acquired by the federal government under purchase with
the consent of the state within the scope of clause 17, the state is without
legislative jurisdiction therein unless such be reserved. Exclusive federal
taxing authority within an area thus acquired is held to arise from the
declaration of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, clause 17,
that congress shall have authority over places acquired by the consent of the
state "for the erection of forts, magazines, dockyards and other needful
buildings," "like (the) authority" it exercises over the district which is
the seat of the federal government; that is, the broad power of "exclusive
legislation whatsoever." 8 Consent by the state therefore without reservation is considered a prerequisite to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal government.9
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

322 U.S. 174 at 176, 64 S.Ct. 908, 88 L.Ed. 1209 (1944).
Atkinson v. State Tax Commissioner of Oregon, 303 U.S. 20, 58 S.Ct. 419, 82 L.Ed.
621 (1938).
Surplus Trading Company v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, at 656, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed.
1091 (1930).
Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed.
264 (1885); State v. Cline, . Okla... 322 P.2d 208 (1958).
Surplus Trading Company v. Cook, supra note 2; Concessions Company v. Morris,
109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655 (1919).
Exclusive legislation is held to be consistent only with exclusive jurisdiction, see
United States v. Allegheny, supra note 3 at 652.
The cession of exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal government by authority of a
state consent statute may be held invalid to the extent that it is violative of a
state constitution, prohibiting alienation of the power to tax. States having such
constitutional provisions deny that the Federal Constitution, in granting exclusive
jttrisdiction to Congress through state legislative consent, could or was intended to

NOTES

Although acceptance by federal authority is impliedly required by
the state consent statutes, in order to vest federal jurisdiction, this is
presumed' 0 in the absence of a disclaimer." After acceptance, and without reservation on the part of the state, the state will be without jurisdiction within the enclave unless the federal government should refuse to
accept exclusive jurisdiction,1'2 cede back to the state some jurisdiction,' 3
or consent to state taxation of private interests or private use of federal
exempt property therein, 14 or unless the' land be used for purposes other
than that provided for within the constitutional provision for which
acquired.' 5
State consent statutes are to be strictly construed and relinquishment of
the state taxing power will not be presumed unless the language in which
the surrender is made is clear and unmistakable. 16 General statutory
consent statutes enacted by many states allowing the federal government to
purchase lands with consent of the state without expressly ceding exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal government, have been held insufficient to divest
7
the state of concurrent jurisdiction.'
empower the state legislature to give this consent notwithstanding state constitu-

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

16.
17.

tional prohibition. International Business Machine Corporation v. Evans, 213 Ga.
333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957); the purpose of the requirement of consent in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 was not held to authorize the states to cede jurisdiction, since
they would have had this power in the absence of any specific constitutional provision. Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 540-1, 5 S.Ct.
995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885) ; but rather to protect the state by making consent a prerequisite to the exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction, 5 Elliott, The Debates in
Several State Conventions on Adopting The Federal Constitution 511 (1881).
Robbins v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 13 S.Ct. 60, 36 L.Ed. 991 (1892).
Silas Mason Company v. State Tax Commissioner, 302 U.S. 186 at 207, 58 S.Ct. 233,
82 L.Ed. 187 (1937) ; Yellowstone Park Transpoitation Company v. Galatin County,
31 F.2d 644 (1929).
Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 66 S.Ct. 663, 90 L.Ed. 818 (1946).
See the Buck Act enacted by Congress in 1940, Title 4, U.S.C.A. §§ 105-110, which
contains the following provision: "No person shall be relieved from liability for
payment of, collection of, or accounting for any sales or use tax levied by a state
. . . on the ground that the sale or use, with respect to which such tax is levied,
occurred whole or in part within a Federal area; and such state or taxing authority
shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax in any
Federal area within such state to the same extent and with the same effect as
though such area was not a Federal area." Davis v. Howard, 302 Ky. 149, 206 S.W.2d
467 (1947); McKee v. Bureau of Revenue, 63 N.M. 185. 315 P.2d 832 (1957). See
also the Lea Act, 4 U.S.C.A. § 106.
Offutt Housing Company v. Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253, 76 S.Ct. 814, 100 L.Ed. 1151 (1956).
When land procured under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 by consent of the state
or by condemnation for a purpose public and is not so used, the legislative power
of the state over the places acqiuired will be as full and complete as over any other
place within her limits, Mississippi River Fuel Corporation v. Fontenot, 234 F.2d 898
(1956), certiorari denied, 352 U.S. 916 (1956) ; Nikis v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
114 Va. 618, 131 S.E. 236 (1926).
In James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302
U.S. 134, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 125 (1937) it was held that a narrow construction
of the statute is rejected as being inconsistent with the broad purpose of the Constitution which gives the federal government powers and duties other than that
of providing for the National defense, and the phrase "other needful buildings"
has been construed as embracing whatever structures are found to be necessary in
the performance of the functions of the federal government.
91 C.J.S., United States § 7, Note 59, P. 21, Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 66 S.Ct.
663, 90 L.Ed. 818 (1946):
Rvan v. State, 188 Wash. 115, 61 P.2d 1277, 1281 (1936).
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Lands acquired without the consent of the state do not vest the
federal government with exclusive jurisdiction to tax. 18 When lands are
acquired by condemnation or eminent domain, and forts, arsenals, magazines and dockyards, or other public buildings are erected for the use of
the federal government, such buildings with their appurtenances, as
instrumentalities for the erection of its powers, will be free from any such
interference of the state as would destroy or impair their effective use for
the purposes designed.' 9 And the state may cede to the United States
exclusive jurisdiction in a manner not prescribed in the constitution or
may prescribe conditions to the cession, if they are not inconsistent with
the effective use of the property for the purposes intended. 20 But where
the state has ceded exclusive jurisdiction and has reserved no power with
21
respect to taxation, it may not thereafter impose a tax.
'Where the United States acquires land from the state for purposes not
specified in the constitution by purchase with states consent, the United
States has such jurisdiction over the land as may be ceded to it by the
state. Where the United States acquires land from the state for purposes
not specified in the constitution in any manner other than by purchase
with the states consent, the United States holds the land just as any other
22
proprietor, except that the land itself may not be taxed by the state.
Land owned by the United States within a state admitted to the
Union, passes to the state on admission and the federal government will
only have such jurisdiction in the premises as it expressly reserved when
the state was created. 23 Without reservation, the federal government will
24
only have such jurisdiction as is ceded back by the state.
The federal government may also acquire land underlying navigable
streams under power conferred by congress by Article 1, Section 8, Clause
3, for purposes of construction of warves, piers, bridges, and dams and other
18.

St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Company v. Satterfield. 27 F.2d 586 (C.C.A. 8th
1928); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 499 (1875).

19.

Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed.
264 (1885); see also Kohl v. United States, Ibid.
Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company, supra note 15; Surplus Trading Company

20.

v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930) ; State v. Cline, ____
Okla.
322 P.2d 208 (1958).

21.

Standard Oil Company of California v. People of State of California, 291 U.S. 242,
54 S.Ct. 526, 78 L.Ed. 775 (1934). There is, however, some authority to the effect
that where a state has ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government in a
manner not provided for in the federal Constitution, the state laws in effect at the
time of the cession and not inconsistent with the federal laws and use thereof by the
federal government will persist until repealed by Congress, in re Ladd, 71 Fed.
31, 38 (C.C.D. Neb. 1896); Chicago R.I. and Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542,

5 S.Ct. 1005, 29 L.Ed. 270 (1885); Arlington Hotel Company v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439,
22.

23.
24.

49 S.Ct. 227, 73 L.Ed. 447 (1929).
Ryan v. State, 188 Wash. 115, 61 P.2d 1277, 1281

(1936).

Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed.
264 (1885); St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad v. Satterfield, 27 Fed. 886 (C.C.A. 8th
1928).
Rogers v. Squier, 157 F.2d 948 (C.C.A. 9th 1946); State v. Cline .... Okla ...... 322
P.2d 208 (1958).

NOTES

facilities aiding and advancing navigation and commerce. 25 The exclusive
power of the federal government to regulate commerce which extends to
the navigable waters of the country and to lands beneath them, did not give
to the federal government exclusive jurisdiction thereover, except in
matters relating to regulation of commerce and navigation. 26 Title to
lands underlying navigable waterways passed to the states upon entry
into the Union by virtue of their sovereignty, and the state is free to
exercise exclusive legislative jurisdiction in all other matters within its
territorial boundaries to the extent that it does not interfere with the
federal purpose of regulating commerce and navigation, except in such
instances as it has in some manner relinquished jurisdiction to the federal
27
government.
The states may, therefore, in the absence of a cession of exclusive
jurisdiction, tax private property and private interests within federal
property used in construction projects or other facilities located on such
waters for the purposes of facilitating navigation and commerce. If the
federal government is to prevent state imposition of property, use or
income taxes on federal contractors on such waters, it must acquire the
area without reservation of any taxing authority by the state or must
immunize the activity and those involved thereon from taxation.
Where lands are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
they are immune from taxation by a state and even private property or
possessory interests thereon are not subject to state taxation. 28 However,
assuming that the state does have jurisdiction to tax within a federal area
and possesses the requisite statutory authorization, it may subject to
taxation any possessory property interests therein that private individuals
may hold.29
The states have the right to subject unpatented mining claims or
possessory rights therein to an ad valorem tax. 3 0 Taxation of a mining
claim even though unpatented is taxation of a possessory right asserted
not by the United States, but by others not immune from taxation by the
state. 3 ' The tax is not the same in this regard as tax on minerals in place
or a tax on the fee simple title. It is the possessory interest which is taxable
and not the mine itself, and the tax must of necessity be designed to tax
that possessory interest else it may be objected to as a taxation of immune
2
federal property.3
It is equally well established that the states may tax improvements on
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Atkinson v. State Tax Commissioner, 303 U.S. 20, 58 S.Ct. 417, 82 L.Ed. 621 (1938).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Sheridanville Inc. v. Borough of Wrightstown, 225 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1955).
84 C.J.S. Taxation, § 199; Paso Robles War Memorial Hospital District v. Negley,
29 Cal.2d 203, 173 P.2d 813 (1946).
Consolidated Uranium Mines Inc., 156 F.Supp. 24 (U.S.D.C.D. Utah 1957).
Ibid.
Ibid.
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federal lands made by pre-emptioners, homestead and other claimants or
occupants at their own expense. 33
The states may tax lands and improvements entered under homestead
reclamation acts even if the patent itself has not issued from the federal
government.3 4 Such lands and improvements, however, are not subject
to state taxation until the equitable title has passed to the entryman and
this occurs upon final proof and issuance of a final certificate showing
that the entryman has performed all conditions precedent to the acquiring
of title. 35 The patent is merely the formal grant following this procedure,
being at the convenience of the land office and is often delayed. The
situation is analagous to those instances where land over which the federal
government had exclusive jurisdiction is sold to a private individual and
the government retains legal title for security and the land being taxed
to the private individuals under real estate taxes because the transaction
was in reality a mortgage and the government a mortgagee and not the
36
owner of the lands.
Improvements made on federal lands held by private individuals
under lease are taxable to the lessee as personal or real property if by the
terms of the lease title to the same are in him with the right of removal up
to the termination of the lease. 3 7 Without such provisions, and in such
instances as improvements become property of the federal government as
owner of the fee, the lands or buildings are not taxable to the lessee under
ad valorem real property statutes. The United States consent to waiver
of its immunity from taxation of real property is to the extent of permitting
local taxation of a lessee's interest in government property, but such a
statute is permissive only and no tax is possible unless local tax statutes
provide for it,38 and it has been held that a real property tax did not
39
provide for taxation of the lessee's interest.
The doctrine of tax immunity of the federal government which
originated in the McCulloch case, remained intact for more than a century
before beginning a phase of constant shrinkage. The most significant
narrowing of this concept was effected in 1937 when the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld a gross receipts tax upon a federal contractor
engaged in federal construction, because it placed no direct burden upon
40
the federal government.
33.

61 C.J. p.364 , note 33; Paso Robles War Memorial Hospital District v. Negley, 29

34.
35.
36.

Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219, 42 S.Ct. 293, 62 L.Ed. 573 (1922).
Ibid.
Land O'Lakes Dairy Company v. Wadena County, 229 Minn. 263, 39 N.W.2d 164
(1949); S.R.A. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851 (1936).
Dayton Development Ft. Hamilton Corporation v. Boyland, 133 N.Y.S.2d 831
(S.Ct. Kings County 1954).
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Bd. of Assessors of Town of Riverhead,
161 N.Y.S.2d 393, 2 N.Y.2d 500, 141 N.E.2d 794 (1957).
Fort Hamilton Manor Inc. v. Boyland, 173 N.Y.S.2d 90, 4 N.Y.2d 192, 149 N.E.2d
856 (1958).
James Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U.S. 134, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937).

37.
38.
39.
40.

Cal.2d 203, 173 P.2d 813 (1946).

NOTES

Originally in a series of cases, the Court held that sales or excise taxes
could not be collected on goods sold to departments or instrumentalities
of the federal government on the theory that the burden fell ultimately on
the latter, 4' or imposed on economic burden thereon. 4 2 By 1941 the
impact of the economic burden on the federal government through the
operation of the contract with the private individual was not considered
paramount. The Court in Alabama v. King Boozer 43 upheld a state sales
tax imposed not directly upon the government, but directly upon a government contractor for materials purchased' by him for use in the performance
of a government contract. The contract was cost-plus which provided that
the United States would re-imburse the contractor for taxes paid. The
Court declared that a state tax was not invalid merely because the economic
burden of the tax would be shifted to the federal government through the
operation of the contract.
Against this trend of restricting federal immunity from state taxation
44
stand two Supreme Court decisions, Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock,
and United States v. Allegheny County,4

5

both of which have been dis-

tinguished on their facts.
The Kern-Limerick case involved as did the Alabama case, the imposition of a state sales tax on goods purchased by a federal contractor for
use in fulfilling a cost-plus fixed fee contract. The tax was held unconstitutional as a direct imposition on goods purchased by the federal government.
The Kern-Limerick case has since been held to spell the outer limits
of the Alabama case and has been distinguished from the latter in that
pursuant to the terms of the contract, the contractor in the Kern case was
only a purchasing agent of the federal government, and title to the goods
passed directly to the United States from the vendor thus making the
government the purchaser. 46 In the King Boozer contract, title was to' vest
in the federal government only after delivery of the materials to the contractor and an inspection by federal officials. Thus while the United
States bore the economic burden of the state tax in each instance, the
incidence or directness of the tax in the Alabama case fell on the contractor
and not the United States.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 48 S.Ct. 451, 72 L.Ed. 857 (1928) ; Indian
Motorcycle Company v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 51 S.Ct. 601, 75 LEd. 1277
(1936).
See Indian Motorcycle Company v. United States, ibid.
314 U.S. 1, 62 S.Ct. 43, 86 L.Ed. 3 (1941).
347 U.S. 110, 74 S.Ct. 403, 98 L.Ed. 546 (1954).
322 U.S. 174, 64 S.Ct. 908, 88 L.Ed. 1209 (1944).
Armed Services Procurement Act, 62 Stat. 21, 41 U.S.C. (Supp. V.) § 157 et seq.,
"Material - Purchases": "(a) . . . equipment required for the accomplishment of
the work under this contract shall be furnished by the contractor. The contractor
shall act as purchasing agent for the government in effecting such procurement and
the government shall be directly liable to the vendors for the purchase price."
" (b) . . . title to all such . . . equipment . . . shall pass directly from vendor to
the government without vesting in the contractor, and such title . . . shall vest in
the government at the time payment is made therefore by the government or the
contractor, whichever of said events shall first occur."
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As a result of these cases and others, it is well established that taxes
may be imposed on goods sold to as well as goods held by federal contractors in fulfilling federal contracts through the title vesting provisions
of which the goods would ultimately but not directly vest in the federal
government.
It has very recently been established in the Supreme Court of the
United States, by three Michigan cases, that users of tax exempt property,
title to which was in the federal government, whether in fulfillment of
federal contracts or for use in their own commercial activities, could not
avail themselves of the immunity of the federal government, and the use
of the property was held taxable to them as the taxes imposed were
designed to tax their interests and did not effect a tax directly on federal
property. 47 To be a valid tax, the state must attempt to segregate the
interest of the private person from that of the federal government and
tax it, and the consent of the federal government is not necessary unless
it be within a federal enclave in which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction.
In City of Detroit v. Murray Corporation,48 Murray corporation, a
sub-contractor under a prime contract for the manufacture of airplane
parts for the United States, was taxed upon personalty acquired for
performance of the sub-contract by both city and county authorities. Title
to the property assessed had passed to the United States. Murray paid the
taxes under protest and brought suit to recover the taxes. The United
States intervened claiming title to the property. The district court held
that the property had been improperly subjected to the tax and the court
of appeals affirmed; on certiorari from the United States Supreme Court,
held, reversed. The constitutional right of tax immunity of the federal
government is not infringed by local taxes the incidence of which fall
upon the possession of government property.
The Murray Corporation relied on United States v. County of
Allegheny which held that the state did not have the power to tax the
property of the federal government. 49 The taxes in the Murray case were
styled a personal property tax and Murray relied on this to support its
contention that the taxes were actually levied against the property of the
United States. The court explained that the Allegheny case was not controlling as the state there had not attempted to separate the taxpayers
interest from that of the government. 50 The court in the Allegheny case
had expressely reserved the question whether a state could tax a person
possessing federal property for the possession and use of such property in
47.

City of Detroit v. Murray Corporation of America, 355 U.S. 489, 78 S.Ct. 485, 2
L.Ed.2d 441 (1958); United States v. City of Detroit, 255 U.S. 466, 78 S.Ct. 474,
2 L.Ed. 424 (1958); United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 78 S.Ct.
483, 2 L.Ed. 436 (1958).
48. 355 U.S. 489, 78 S.Ct. 485, 2 L.Ed.2d 441 (1938).
49. 255 U.S. 489 at 494 (1958).
59. Ibid.

NOTES

connection with his own profit making. In the Murray case, however,
there was state statutory authorization for the taxation of Murray's
possessory interest in the federal property. The particular Michigan
statute involved here did not expressly state that the person in possession
is taxed "for the privilege of using or possessing" personal property, but
the court felt that to strike down a tax because of such verbal omission
would only prove a victory for empty formalisms. 5 ' The court felt that
lawful possession of property was a valuable right when the possessor could
use such for his own personal benefit and was therefore taxable to the
2
individual if the requisite authority so provided.5
The general property tax of Michigan as well as the City of Detroit
did provide that a lien would attach to the property for the failure to
pay and that unpaid taxes would become a personal debt against the owner
of the property. 53 The majority of the court did not consider these
provisions controlling, but the dissent felt that they were significant in
illustrating that the taxes were in fact taxes on the property itself and
not on the privilege of possession.
In the two other Michigan cases, United States v. Township of
Muskegon, and United States v. City of Detroit, the parties taxed were
using either by lease or permit tax exempt real property of the federal
government. 4 One of the lessees, Borg-,Varner, was leasing from the
government an industrial plant in Detroit for use in their private manufacturing business, and the other lessee, Continental Motors, was leasing
another plant for use in fulfilling federal contracts. The property was
held taxable to the lessees tinder Michigan real property law which provided that when tax-exempt property is used by a private party in business
conducted for profit that person is subject to taxation to the same extent
as though he owned the property. 55
In sustaining the tax, the court held that a tax on the lessee's or
permit holder's privilege of using tax exempt property for his own
personal advantage is not a tax on the exempt property itself and therefore not uncontitutional.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.

The relevant statutory provisions are set forth in full in 6 Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 7.1,
7.10, 7.81, Comp. Laws 1948, §§ 211.1, 211.10, 211.40, and Tit. VI, c. II, § 1 and
Tit. VI, c. IV, §§ 1, 7. 26, 27, of the Charter of the City of Detroit. They provide
in part that "The owners or persons in possession of personal property shall
pay all taxes assessed thereon. . . . In case any person by agreement or otherwise
ought to pay such tax, or any part thereof, the person in possession who shall pay
the same may recover the amount from the person who ought to have paid the
same."
Supra note 49 at 492.
Supra note 49 at 501.
Supra note 47.
The
Now complied in 6 Mich. Stat. Ann. 1950 (Supp. 1957) §§ 7:7 (5) and (6).
act reads: An act to provide for the taxation of lessees and users of tax exempt
property, Section 1. When any real property which for any reason is exempt from
taxation is loaned, leased or otherwise made available to and used by a private
individual, association or corporation in connection with a business conducted
for profit, such property . . . shall be subject to taxation in the same amount and
to the same extentas though the lessee or user were the owner of such property.
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It is significant that the Michigan statute providing for taxation of
the lessees and user of tax exempt real property involved in these cases
expressly provided that such taxes would not, if assessed against lessees,
effect a lien against the property and would only effect a personal debt
of the lessee when due. 56 Such provisions were expressly commented on in
the majority opinion in upholding the position that the taxes were imposed
not on the federal property but on the lessees for their use thereof. The
court here unlike the City of Detroit v. Murray Corporation57 case gave
significance to these facts in determining that the tax was not levied on
the property of the United States and declared that in so determining, it
was necessary to consider all relevant factors involved in the nature of
the tax.
It was argued on the part of the government and the corporations
taxed, that since the tax was measured by the value of the property used,
it should not be treated as anything else but a contrivance to lay a tax
on the property itself. The court held, however, that such a reassuring
device was neither irregular nor extravagant. It was believed that the
act providing for such taxation was apparently designed to equalize the
annual tax burden carried by private businesses using tax exempt property
with that of other businesses using non-exempt property. The use of
exempt property is worth as much as use of comparable taxed property
during the same interval, and as such a permissible exercise of the taxing
power of Michigan to so compute it. 5s A number of earlier decisions by
the United States Supreme Court had supported this method of computing
the amount of taxes for privilege of using tax exempt property. 59
It can be said in conclusion, therefor, that for the most part intergovernmental tax immunity as it should be known remains and a tax
which is a tax directly on federal immune property itself will be held
unconstitutional and void. However, in so far as concerns private persons
claiming immunity for the ordinary business operations connected with
governmental activities, no implied constitutional immunity will be
granted upon the basis of hypothetical interferences with governmental
functions or by passing it off as a d;--ct tax on federal property.
As regards the right of a state to tax private interests in federal
property, it can be said generally that if the state is without jurisdiction
to tax in a particular federal area, it will have authority to tax therein
only when consented to by the federal government, and only to the extent
so consented. If on the other hand, the state has jurisdiction therein all
possessory interests of private individuals are taxable by the state if the
authority granted the taxing authorities is sufficiently broad to cover such
56.

6 Mich. Stat. Ann. 1950 (Supp. 1957) §§ 7.7(5) and (6), section 2.
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355 U.S. 466 at 469 (1958).
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interests, and this is equally true to all federal property, real or personal,
held or used by private individuals for their own gain. 60

Congress can, however, if and when it desires under its sovereign
powers immunize any federal agency or activity from state taxation and
thereby prevent even the taxation of private interests in federal property
used or held under government contract, and thus could have changed in
advance the outcome of the Alabama and Dravo cases.
GEORGE

J.

ARGERIS

PRIORITY BETWEEN MORTGAGES AND MECHANICS LIENS
In the Colorado decision of Darien v. Hudson,' the issue of priority
arose between a purchase money mortgage and a mechanic's lien. The
mortgagee had given the mortgagor additional funds to repair the house
on the property and had the mortgage recorded immediately. The mortgagor failed to apply these funds for the improvements, and as a result
mechanics liens were filed by the materialmen. The court held that the
mortgage did not take priority over the lien claimants, even though recorded first. Before discussing the cases that are relevant to this problem,
the Wyoming lien law and its interpretation should be considered.
Our Wyoming lien law was taken from Missouri. The three sections
which are pertinent to this problem say in substance that a mechanic's
lien shall attach to a building or improvement in preference to any prior
lien or incumbrance upon the land; that such building can be sold and
removed by the purchaser; 2 that a mechanic's lien shall be preferred to liens
that attach subsequent to the commencement of the building or improvement; 3 and that a mechanic's lien shall not affect any lien, incumbrance or
mortgage upon the land that was in existence at the inception of the
4
mechanic's lien.
These three sections were discussed in Prugh v. Imhoff. 5 The rule
seems to be that a separate and distinct building or erection is required
for the lien to have preference over an earlier mortgagee and where the
lien results only from repairs or improvements, the mechanic's lien is not
prior. As the court said in interpreting these sections, since a mortgage
covers the building as well as the land, the lien for repairs, or improvements which are put upon such existing building, will be subject to the
prior lien of the mortgage or deed of trust; otherwise, one's principal
60.
I.
2.
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